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1.  Introduction  
The Index of Donor Performance (IDP), an essential element in the Commitment to 
Development Index (CDI), is continuing to gain much attention for evaluating the 
degree of contribution by donor countries to development efforts in developing 
countries.  
Since 2003, the Center for Global Development (CGD) and the journal Foreign 
Policy have been jointly engaged in the compilation of the CDI and have published it 
every year (e.g., Foreign Policy, Sep/Oct 2006).   
The CDI rates 21 advanced countries on their degree of contribution to developing 
countries. Each country is assessed in seven areas: aid, trade, investment, migration, 
environment, security, and technology, and an average overall score is produced. (In 
2003 technology was not included and there were six areas. Since 2004 there have been 
seven areas for assessment.)   
Table 1 gives an overview of the CDI published in 2006. The 2006 edition of the 
index assesses performance in 2004. Japan’s average score for the seven areas is 3.1, the 
lowest score among the 21 developed countries assessed. Japan is the lowest for two 
areas: trade and aid. It should be noted that since 2003 when the CDI was first published, 
Japan has consistently ranked bottom among the 21 countries.   
   2
Table 1: The Commitment to Development Index (CDI) (2006) 













Netherlands 8.5  6.2  7.8 4.8 7.5 6.1 5.3  6.6
Denmark 10.0  5.9  5.3 5.0 6.1 6.9 5.5  6.4
Sweden 9.8  6.1  6.2 4.8 7.0 4.9 5.4  6.3
Norway 9.3  1.2  8.0 4.6 6.1 8.1 5.9  6.2
New Zealand  2.2  7.6  3.7 6.9 6.4 7.4 4.9  5.6
Australia 2.5  6.4  6.9 6.4 3.9 8.1 4.6  5.5
Austria 2.7  5.9  3.3 10.5 6.2 4.5 4.5  5.4
Finland 3.9  6.1  6.2 2.7 6.7 6.3 6.3  5.4
Germany 3.3  5.9  6.8 6.2 6.7 3.7 4.3  5.3
Canada 3.3  6.8  7.7 4.7 4.5 3.0 6.6  5.2
Switzerland 4.8  3.1  7.2 9.5 5.3 1.6 5.1  5.2
United Kingdom  4.6  5.9  8.6 2.6 7.8 1.6 4.5  5.1
Ireland 5.9  5.7  2.5 4.6 7.5 5.9 3.0  5.0
United States  2.2  7.4  6.9 4.6 3.2 5.9 5.0  5.0
Belgium 5.1  5.9  6.5 2.6 6.6 3.4 4.5  4.9
Portugal 2.3  6.1  6.2 1.4 6.4 6.2 5.1  4.8
Spain 2.5  6.0  6.7 5.2 3.8 3.5 6.1  4.8
France 4.1  6.0  5.9 2.6 6.1 0.5 6.9  4.6
Italy 1.6  6.1  5.5 3.2 4.8 3.9 5.1  4.3
Greece 2.7  5.9  4.0 1.7 5.2 5.6 3.0  4.0
Japan 1.1  -0.4  5.6 1.7 4.3 2.8 6.3  3.1
(Source) CGD homepage.   
(http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/data_graphs  ）   3
Ranking persistently bottom in the CDI despite being the world’s second largest 
donor has prompted the Japanese government and Japan's aid agencies to voice their 
opinions concerning problems with the CDI
1. There have also been critiques of the CDI 
from Japanese academia (Sawada, et al (2004); Kawai (2005)). For example, Kawai 
(2005) asserts that a CDI with a quantification process not based on positive analysis is 
arbitrary (p.242). Although the details of such critiques are omitted in this paper, we 
note that the majority of Japanese government officials and academics find the CDI 
unacceptable whatever its content, in part because Japan has been ranked the lowest.   
Our position is different from the critical approach they adopt, as we first closely 
investigate the contents of the CDI, and then attempt to identify areas that require 
further debate. Categorical refusal of the CDI is tantamount to an attempt to turn away 
from international discussion on improvement of development aid. We would like to 
make it clear from the outset that the objective of this paper is to review the 
methodology of aid evaluation, not to present a counter-argument aimed at vindicating 
Japanese aid. Rather, we are appreciative of the CGD’s efforts to incorporate an element 
of evaluation that views aid from a qualitative perspective.   
Although there are many and varied complex discussions on the methods of 
calculation for each individual index, this paper aims to discuss in particular the 
calculation method for the Index of Donor Performance (IDP).  Problems concerning 
the calculation method for the IDP have also been discussed by Sawada et al. (2004), 
but their work focused on the 2003 edition of the index, and as the IDP calculation 
method has undergone considerable change since then, this paper seeks to engage in a 
renewed discussion based on the 2006 edition of the index.   
                                                  
1 Refer to The Record of the Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Related 
Matters, No.6, House of Councilors, 164
th Session of the Diet.     4
In the next section an overview of the calculation method of the IDP will be given in 
accordance with Roodman (2006), after which, in Section 3 and 4, a discussion will 
concentrate our discussion on “selectivity” and “project proliferation,” which are 
considered the most important and relevant factors according to the on-going discussion 
around “Paris” declaration. The findings of the paper and suggestions to improve the 
index are then presented in a conclusion.   
 
2.  Overview of the Compilation Method of the Index of Donor Performance (IDP)   
The IDP is compiled based on CRS (Creditor Reporting System) data published by 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). This aid-related database combines figures on 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Aid (OA), which is concessional 
in character and disbursed to wealthier non-DAC members such as the states of the 
former Soviet Union, Israel, and Singapore. The actual disbursement of ODA and OA is 
continued to be evaluated through various procedures as follows:   
 
Process of compiling the IDP 
(a) Subtraction of debt forgiveness 
(b) Discounting Tied aid 
(c) Introducing the concept of selectivity 
(d) Subtracting debt services 
(e) Introducing the concept of project proliferation 
(f)  Adding the factor of contribution to international organization 
(g) Considering policy effects on donations 
(h) Finally, dividing by Gross National Income 
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The introduction of selectivity and project proliferation can be said to be unique 
aspects that characterize IDP. The introduction of selectivity is an assessment standard 
addressing the question of, “Are donor countries making appropriate selections?” and 
the introduction of the concept of project proliferation is an assessment standard that 
seeks to “penalize project proliferation that exceeds the beneficiary country’s capacity 
to receive assistance.”   
With regard to all the aid donor countries subject to assessment as shown in Table 2, 
calculations are made from: ① Gross aid, ② Tying-discount gross transfer, ③ Gross 
quality adjusted aid for selectivity and proliferation, ④ Quality adjusted repayments, ⑤ 
Quality adjusted donations to international organizations, ⑥ Quality adjusted charitable 
giving, and ⑦ Gross National Income (GNI), and then a ratio is calculated in the 
following way: (③－④＋⑤＋⑥) ÷ ⑦.    The score of IDP is calculated based on this 
ratio. 
What we notice by looking at this table is that in the process of transfer from  ② to 
③, the absolute value of aid falls sharply. In other words, the quality adjustment effect 
due to the introduction of the concepts of selectivity and project proliferation is large.     6
Table 2: Summary of Donor Evaluation 






























Australia  1,195  1,153  331 0 116 94  595,630  0.09%
Austria  514  315  98 2 176 7  290,943  0.10%
Belgium   972  762  353 33 310 25  357,207  0.18%
Canada  2,115  1,863  790 14 275 100  970,536  0.12%
Denmark  1,331  1,280  597 50 311 6  240,474  0.36%
Finland  407  401  160 0 100 1  185,126  0.14%
France  8,073  5,993  1,879 398 1,530 50  2,058,806  0.15%
Germany  5,531  4,841  1,644 576 1,950 207  2,729,147  0.12%
Greece  354  316  112 0 85 3  204,300  0.10%
Ireland  413  413  220 0 65 44  156,186  0.21%
Italy  1,005  888  237 102 822 5  1,669,301  0.06%
Japan  11,114  10,721  3,416 2,639 1,031 73  4,759,022  0.04%
Netherlands  3,266  2,944  1,257 263 683 73  573,127  0.31%
New Zealand  160  149  51 0 18 4  90,623  0.08%
Norway  1,587  1,587  592 3 211 47  251,528  0.34%
Portugal  878  173  53 3 86 0  164,404  0.08%
Spain  1,595  1,415  533 63 430 20  1,018,232  0.09%
Sweden  2,199  2,142  1,041 0 196 1  350,192  0.35%
Switzerland  1,286  1,269  428 4 177 54  376,621  0.17%
United 
Kingdom 
5,684  4,928  2,405 125 1,247 55  2,179,558  0.16%
Unites States  18,812  16,576  6,146 501 1,726 1,909  11,656,110  0.08%
Source: Roodman (2006b) 
 
Table 3 shows the selectivity weight, which is the selectivity index, and the size 
weight, which is the project proliferation index, for each country. The result of 
multiplying these two gives the size of the discount for quality adjustment, and it can be   7
seen that there is a large difference between discount values, from 0.51 for Ireland to 
0.24 for Austria. In the next chapter and onwards we discuss in detail the problems with 
selectivity and size weight.   
 
Table 3 : Selectivity and Size Weight of Donors 







Ireland  0.65  0.78  0.51
United Kingdom  0.59  0.77  0.45
Denmark  0.63  0.71  0.45
Sweden  0.56  0.76  0.43
Belgium   0.55  0.76  0.42
Netherlands  0.59  0.67  0.40
Canada  0.57  0.67  0.38
Finland  0.54  0.66  0.36
Spain  0.48  0.73  0.35
Norway  0.56  0.59  0.33
Germany  0.51  0.64  0.33
Greece  0.41  0.79  0.32
Unites States  0.49  0.65  0.32
New Zealand  0.54  0.56  0.30
Japan  0.52  0.58  0.30
Portugal  0.59  0.48  0.28
France  0.43  0.64  0.28
Switzerland  0.54  0.50  0.27
Australia  0.54  0.48  0.26
Italy  0.49  0.50  0.25
Austria  0.46  0.53  0.24
Source: Roodman (2006b) 
 
3.  The issue of selectivity   8
3.1. Calculation method of selectivity 
The concept of selectivity is grounded on the idea that the poorer a country is the 
more it requires aid, and the higher the quality of governance in the recipient country, 
the greater the effectiveness of aid that will be achieved.  Based on this, CGD regards 
donors whose proportion of aid provided to countries that are deemed appropriate for 
such aid (better governance, lower income) is higher as donors whose actions are more 
optimal. CGD created an index to measure these optimal actions of donors, referred to 
as “Gross selectivity.”   
 
The calculation method for gross selectivity is as follows:   
(a) Firstly a government selectivity multiplier [0,1] is derived from the composite 
governance index of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) (which is an average of 
six dimensional governance indices) (the greater the multiplier, the better the 
governance).  
(b) Next a GDP selectivity multiplier [0,2] is derived from the logarithmic value of the 
2003 GDP per capita in dollar terms, calculated using exchange rates (the greater the 
multiplier, the greater the degree of poverty).   
(c) Multiplying the above two multipliers and making adjustment results in a selectivity 
multiplier for recipient countries. In 2004 Bhutan was the country with the highest value 
of 0.98 and Kuwait had the lowest value of 0.04. In other words, Bhutan has good 
governance but low income, whereas Kuwait is a country with poor governance and 
high income.   
(d) Here “Gross selectivity” is computed by a division: the total amount of aid from a 
donor multiplied by the abovementioned selectivity multiplier (c) for each recipient is   9
divided by the total amount of aid by the donor. 
(e) Then multiplying the gross selectivity value by the amount of aid gives a figure for 
aid depicting selectivity.  There are two exceptions to the gross selectivity weighting 
method described above.  The first is emergency assistance. Emergency assistance is 
not discounted, since it seems to be effective even in the poorest-governed countries. 
Another exception is “assistance that seeks to improve governance,” which is given an 
across-the-board discount ratio of 50%.
2 For example, in the case of Afghanistan and 
similar countries this brings the discount rate to 75%, with a discount rate of 50% being 
applied to assistance that seeks to improve governance in countries with poor 
governance.  Assistance that seeks to improve governance is that classed under the 
DAC CRS code in the 15000 range. 
 
3.2. Appropriateness of a standard for governance   
Of the two standards for selectivity, namely “poverty” and “good governance,” it is 
thought that with regard to the latter, the assumption is made that “the better governance, 
then so too the greater the effect of assistance.” This is thought to have been reflected in 
the insistence in development economics in recent years that “good governance is 
necessary for development,” although a conclusion still has yet to be reached on a 
statistical causal linkage between good governance and aid effectiveness.   
With regard to discussions on aid effectiveness, the conclusion of Burnside and 
Dollar (2000): “aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good 
policies” is famous, but subsequently the robustness of their findings has been 
contradicted in a great deal of research (e.g. Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004; 
                                                  
2  The concept of a discount rate for assistance that seeks to improve governance was adopted from 
2006.    10
Roodman 2004; Rajan and Subramanian 2005). Originally Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
used trade liberalization, inflation and budget surplus as an index of good policy, and 
they did not use an index for good governance.   
 
3.3. Appropriateness of using the KK index as an index of governance   
However, although there is no statistical evidence, as mentioned above, the concept 
that the lower the governance capacity of a country, the less able it will be to use 
assistance effectively is a concept that has so much become a part of common sense in 
this area that it cannot be easily rejected.  In this context a further issue is that of 
whether or not the use of the governance index of Kaufmann et al., so-called the KK 
index, as an index to measure governance capacity is truly appropriate.   
The governance index of Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2005) as used in the IDP, 
is one that uses six-dimensional governance indices as identified by the authors (Voice 
and accountability, Political instability and violence, Government effectiveness, 
Regulatory burden, Rule of law, Control of corruption) and selects data arbitrarily from 
various data sources (e.g. Country Policy and Institutional Assessments of the World 
Bank; Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, etc.), from which 
each governance index is calculated.   
The problems with the KK index have been pointed out by researchers in recent 
years (e.g. Knack 2006). On January 11, 2007, the World Bank convened a Round Table 
Discussion on the merits and demerits of the KK index.
3  Below, we introduce the three 
major problems with the KK index as identified in Thomas (2006), a paper that was 
announced at the abovementioned meeting.   
                                                  
3  The title of the meeting was: “On Measuring Governance: A Roundtable Discussion.”     11
The first is that the margins of error in the KK index are non-trivial and that their 
sizes vary from country to country. Kaufmann has also acknowledged this point 
(Kaufmann et al. 2005, p.8). With margins of error that differ from country to country 
and using an index that contains such non-trivial values, it is dangerous to compare the 
status of governance of each country (Kaufmann et al. 2005, and refer to Figure 1).   
The second problem is a more fundamental one. Namely, the problem is that the 
definition of “governance” as used by the KK index is vague. Originally, the concept of 
“governance” was thought to be the accumulation of various research in political and 
economic science, but in Kaufman et al.’s KK index the connectivity with this concept 
is not made clear. Kaufman et al. create a six-dimensional construct for governance 
(Voice and Accountability, Political stability and absence of violence, Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Control of corruption), but they do not 
state the reasoning behind the need for six dimensions. The tremendously high degree of 
correlation among these indices makes clear the problems inherent in establishing a 
six-dimensional construct. It is also clear that differences in regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness, and the difference between government effectiveness and 
control of corruption, would be difficult to explain objectively.   
The third problem is inevitably the one concerning the arbitrary selection of data. 
Kaufman et al. calculate indices in six dimensions for the version IV KK index 
announced in 2005, using 37 data items from 31 different data sources. However, there 
are no objective criteria in existence by which to know what data is used to calculate 
which dimensional index. All selections are made arbitrarily by Kaufman.   
That a meeting was held at the World Bank—the institution at which Kaufman was 
originally affiliated—demonstrates that the indices are themselves still in a state of   12
development. Currently at the World Bank, separate indices are being used that are 
known as CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment), by which financing 
decisions are made with regard to beneficiary countries. In the future, even if a 
governance index is incorporated to encourage “the provision of more assistance to 
countries practicing good governance,” it is still too early to know whether the current 
KK index will be used to calculate the Commitment to Development Index (CDI).   
 
One source that actually discusses the validity of the governance index of Kaufman et 
al. is an analysis by Quibria (2006), which highlights a number of very interesting 
points. Quibria grouped developing country members of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) into two categories: countries with a higher governance index than average and a 
group of countries with a lower index value than average (the impact on governance of 
fluctuations in income is omitted) and then compared growth rates. The results of this 
analysis showed that for Asian countries, countries with poor governance demonstrated 
high growth rates. Representative examples of such countries are China and Vietnam. 
Both of these countries have a poor state of governance when viewed from a Western 
perspective, but in both countries economic performance is robust. It is thought that 
from now on discussion should move to address what kind of “governance” index 
should be compiled—whether a “governance” index for economic development or a 
“governance” index for aid beneficiary countries—and how it should be used. 
 
4.  The issue of project proliferation 
4.1. Method of calculation for size weight 
It has been pointed out that in recent years, aid project proliferation, donor   13
fragmentation, and a lack of coordination have been factors adversely impacting aid 
efficiency.  It is not difficult to imagine that if small countries in Africa were 
bombarded with multiple aid projects, the bureaucrats and officials of these recipient 
countries would be overloaded with the acceptance of missions from donor countries 
and the compilation of reports.    These aid-related problems were identified as an issue 
of aid “harmonization” in order to improve aid effectiveness, and the “Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness” of March 2005 represents an international pledge on this issue, 
similar to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
4 
Based on this, CDG has created a discount rate called “size weights” as a means of 
discounting aid amounts. This means that if a project strays from an optimal size, the 
amount of aid is accordingly discounted. This optimal size is calculated from the 
average value of projects implemented to date and standard deviation, in addition to 
which the “governance index” of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) mentioned 
above is used for its readjustment and calculation. This is based on the idea that 
countries with better governance are more likely to have larger optimal aid project size 
(details of the calculation will be described later). The feature of discounting for 
projects larger than their optimal size was newly deployed in the 2005 edition of the 
IDP.  
The method of calculation is as follows (Roodman 2005c): 
(i)  Roodman considers that project size exhibits a lognormal distribution pattern. It 
is therefore assumed that size weights, which are the discount rate for a project, 
also exhibit a similar pattern. 
 
The relationship between project size distribution and size weight distribution are as 
shown below (Roodman 2005c, Figure 1). The horizontal axis shows the logarithmic 
                                                  
4  Refer to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for information on the Paris Declaration: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/doukou/dac/hl_forum_gai.html   14
value of the project.   
 
Graph 1: Project distribution and size weight which IDP assumes 
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e .  1 μ  and  1 σ  are  the  average 
and variance of the project amount converted to logarithm.   
 
(ii)  It is assumed that the ideal value for a project should be greater than the average 
value because it is thought that there will be a large number of very small 
projects.  
 
(iii)  The weight function = 1 at the optimal value of project size. In other words, at 
the optimal value, the project cannot be discounted. The optimal value for 
project size is denoted by 
KK 2
2
1 1 σ μ + e . The KK of 
KK 2   refers to the governance 
index of Kaufman et al. Multiplying 
KK 2  before 
2
1 1 σ μ + e  is based on the 
concept that that the higher the level of governance, the larger the optimal 
project size will be.  KK  takes a value of zero in the average, and therefore in 
countries with average governance, the optimal project size will be  
2
1 1 σ μ + e , 
because the optimal project size is slightly above the average value, as the   15
discussion above suggests. In other words, 
2





the grounds of 
2
1 σ  are  not  explained. 
 
(iv)  The spread of the weight function is set as double the project distribution (2 1 σ ). 
This reflects that the actual optimal size is uncertain. The grounds for doubling 
the project distribution are also not demonstrated.   
 
(v)  Size is not weighted by project but is weighted based on the calculation of the 
average of the aid activities and the standard deviation (logarithmic size) of each 
donor-recipient pair. Donor aid is assumed to have an accurate lognormal 
distribution, and size-weighted aid is calculated using the following formula.   
 
(Size weighting formula) 
Size weight is derived from the integral of the product of two lognormal curves. 
One curve represents the distribution of aid projects by size, and the other the weights 
corresponding to each size. In other words, through integrating the number of projects 
by size multiplied by the weight corresponding to each size, the size weight is 
calculated.   
 
It is supposed that the following two functions exist (these are derived by 
multiplying the probability density function of the lognormal distribution by  i N ).  1 N  
is the number of projects,  2 N   is the parameters.   











































e   ← Describes weight corresponding to size distribution 
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1 N   is the number of projects, and  1 μ  and  1 σ   can be estimated from the data (average 
and sample variance are calculated by logarithmic conversion of raw data).   
 
In order to determine the three parameters ( 2 N ,  2 μ ,  2 σ ) pertaining to  2 h , the 
following three constraints are set. Firstly the peak value of the weight function is 
conditioned to be 1.    The mode of  2 h  is 
2
2 2 σ μ − e . Accordingly 
2 h (
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Therefore,  






e        （ 2） 
 
In addition,  2 h   is conditioned to peak at 
KK 2
2





1 1 σ μ + e ＝
2
2 2 σ μ − e        
As the value of  2 σ   is defined as below, it is possible to arrange the above formula with 
regard to  2 μ  i n    
 





1 1 σ μ + e )+
2
2 σ = 1 μ +5
2
1 σ +KK ln2  （ 4）   
 
Assigning the six computed parameters ( 1 N ,  2 N ,  1 μ ,  2 μ ,  1 σ , and  2 σ ) to formula 
(1), the size weight between each donor-recipient is calculated and the size weight for 
each donor is calculated.
6 
 
4.2. Problems with calculation of size weight 
Problems arising in calculating the size weight are envisaged thus:   
(i)  Only three parameters ( 1 N ,  1 μ , and  1 σ ) are really used. According to formula 
(1), the larger  1 N   becomes, size weight is expected to increase.   
 
(ii)  It is hypothesized that the distribution of aid projects is lognormal, but it is 
actually not the case. (This will be discussed later).   
 
(iii)  The values for  1 μ  and  1 σ  between donor-recipient, and the values for  1 μ  
and  1 σ  for individual recipients should be different. This signifies that the 
                                                  







e ,” but as this must be a 
typographic error for 
KK 2
2
1 1 σ μ + e , in this paper we therefore calculate 
KK 2
2
1 1 σ μ + e .  
6  Roodman (2006) does not detail how the size weight for each donor country is obtained after 
calculating the size weight between each donor and recipient.     18
optimal project size for recipient countries cannot be uniquely defined.   
 
(iv)  In addition, the optimal size for a project should be determined depending on the 





1 1 σ μ + e   is the formula for determining optimal project size, with this formula, 
the larger the KK governance index becomes (higher governance capacity), the 
larger the optimal project size will be.  However, higher governance capacity 
should mean that governments are capable of managing and operating large 
numbers of projects, and it was not hypothesized that the management and 
operation of large projects would be possible.   
 
(vi)  For countries with a good  KK  governance index and many small projects, the 
computed size weight becomes smaller. In other words, if many projects in the 
education sector are implemented for countries with good governance, the size 
weight is smaller. In contrast, for countries with poor governance, even with the 
provision of infrastructure projects size weight decreases.   
 
(vii)  In addition, since the peak value (optimal size) of the weight function is 
KK 2
2







e , a loss function ) , ( 1 1 σ μ f ＝
KK 2
2






e (distance between optimal 
size and average size) can be established.  ) , ( 1 1 σ μ f ＝
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e ＝0 is 
established where  KK ＝0 and the variance is zero. This is in the case that one 
project was provided to one country, and that if there were many of such projects, 
the size weight would increase (in other words, the amount of aid would not be 
discounted).  
 
Thus there are various problems that arise in the method of calculation of size 
weight. However, it is thought that the hypothesis of lognormal project distribution as 
pointed out in (ii) above is a significant issue.     
 
4.3. The issue of log-normality of aid projects distribution   19
It is certainly true that if you make the global distribution of projects by size as a 
whole from 2001 to 2003, as depicted in Graph 2, it assumes a shape close to a 
lognormal distribution
7. However, as is clear from Table 4, which shows the average 
values for projects vary by sector. Put simply, optimal size calculated collectively for 
projects as a whole is unsubstantial and size weight grounded on this value is an 
inappropriate indicator.   
 












































































































































project size, $ thousand
 
  Source: DAC, CRS statistics 
Table 4: Project Area and Average Value,  2001-2003       units:  US$1000 
Purpose Code  Project area  average N 
 Unclassifiable    203 15 
ｘ  ＜12000  Education   609 17,383 
12000≦  ｘ  ＜13000  Health   617 10,389 
13000≦ x  ＜14000  Population policies    348 13,880 
14000≦ x  ＜15000  Water supply and sanitation    1,483 4,606 
                                                  
7 This is based on CRS commitment data. Duplication of Roodman (2005c), and Figure 1. This is 
the basis for the hypothesis that project distribution is lognormal.     20
15000≦ x  ＜16000  Government and civil society    707 20,581 
16000≦ x  ＜17000  Other social infrastructure    738 13,902 
21000≦ x  ＜22000  Transport and storage    7,866 2,243 
22000≦ x  ＜23000  Communications   603 1,935 
23000≦ x  ＜24000  Energy generation and supply      5,752 1,761 
24000≦ x  ＜25000  Banking and financial services    5,001 1,381 
25000≦ x  ＜26000  Business and other services    1,213 2,186 
31000≦ x  ＜32000  Agriculture, forestry, fishing    898 10,149 
32000≦ x  ＜33000  Industry, mineral resources and 
mining, construction   
730 3,489 
33000≦ x  ＜34000  Trade policy and regulations, 
tourism  
927 1,910 
40000≦ x  ＜50000  Multi-sector 847 15,742 
50000≦ x  ＜60000  Commodity aid and general 
program assistance 
3,027 5,957 
60000≦ x  ＜70000  Actions relating to debt  10,571 1,082 
70000≦ x  ＜80000  Emergency assistance and 
reconstruction   
863 12,525 
90000≦ x  ＜100000  Support to NGOs, etc.    931 10,924 
 Total  1,113 152,040 
Source: DAC, CRS statistics 
 
In addition, the results showing whether the amount for aid projects in the world as 
a whole and on a by-country basis follow a lognormal distribution can be seen in Table 
5, in the form of a statistical test using the Shapiro-Francia normality test.
8 Those for 
which it is not possible to reject the lognormal distribution hypothesis are the 
calculations for the world as a whole and also for Luxembourg and the United States. It 
has been confirmed that it is possible to reject the lognormal distribution hypothesis for 
all other countries.   
 
                                                  
8  Due to problems of sample size in the statistical proof, only 2003 was subject to calculation.    21
Table 5: Shapiro-Francia test for log normality of project size, 2003 
country  Obs  W'  V'  z  Prob>z 
Australia  1,580  0.99404 5.599 3.767 0.0001 
Austria  838  0.96061 22.573 6.503 0.0000 
Belgium  3,334  0.99313 8.242 3.777 0.0001 
Canada  2,064  0.99619 4.102 3.116 0.0009 
Denmark  365  0.89705 27.887 6.901 0.0000 
Finland  604  0.98922 4.596 3.342 0.0004 
France  3,443  0.98958 12.503 4.179 0.0000 
Germany  2,763  0.9911 10.447 4.378 0.0000 
Greece  728  0.98131 9.44 4.836 0.0000 
Ireland  1,808  0.99563 4.428 3.294 0.0005 
Italy  1,583  0.99416 5.487 3.728 0.0001 
Japan  6,064  0.96515 39.068 3.014 0.0013 
Luxembourg  115  0.98144 1.881 1.284 0.0995 
Netherlands  1,865  0.99124 9.018 4.558 0.0000 
New Zealand  757  0.99044 5.001 3.541 0.0002 
Norway  3,646  0.99659 4.094 2.715 0.0033 
Portugal  625  0.99355 2.837 2.318 0.0102 
Spain  4,839  0.99098 10.565 3.184 0.0007 
Sweden  1,730  0.99404 5.903 3.845 0.0001 
Switzerland  1,998  0.99807 2.054 1.707 0.0439 
United Kingdom  1,474  0.99408 5.317 3.678 0.0001 
United States  8,319  0.9986 1.45 0.491 0.3118 
World  59,018  0.99551 3.621 0.003 0.4988 
Source: DAC, CRS statistics 
 
Next, with regard to the United States, for which it is thought that all projects follow 
a lognormal distribution, we proved whether or not aid projects to representative 
beneficiary countries in Africa are lognormal. (Refer to Table 6.) The results show that 
it is not possible to reject log normality for projects targeting Uganda, but for projects 
for Tanzania and Malawi log normality was rejected. Graph 4 compares ordered values 
of aid projects with quantiles of the normal distribution. Here, we can recognize that aid   22
projects by the U.S.A. to Tanzania and Malawi have a wider range of outliers (Figure 4).     
 
Table 6: Shapiro-Francia W' test for log normality of projects by the U.S.A., 2003 
  Obs  W'  V'  z  Prob>z 
United States  8,319 0.9986 1.45 0.491 0.31179 
United States-Tanzania  80 0.93284 5.062 3.122 0.00090 
United States-Malawi  46 0.91063 4.343 2.727 0.00319 
United States-Uganda  155 0.99166 1.083 0.168 0.43311 
Source: DAC, CRS statistics 
 
In other words, what can be confirmed through statistical proofs is that even aid 
projects that seem to have a log normal distribution when classified as the world as a 
whole, the log normality is rejected on a by-country basis, and also the countries which 
were not possible to reject log normality, log normality was rejected when examining 
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Graph 4: Normal Q-Q plots of aid projects by the U.S.A., 2003   
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Source: DAC, CRS statistics 
 
In other words, what can be confirmed through statistical proofs is that even aid 
projects that seem to have a log normal distribution when classified as the world as a 
whole, the log normality is rejected on a by-country basis, and also the countries which 
were not possible to reject log normality, log normality was rejected when examining 
projects in terms of their relationship with individual beneficiary countries.   
 
4.4. Reporting bias problem of CRS data 
As can be seen from Graph 5, there is a strong positive correlation between 
average size weight in IDP and average log aid activity.  In other words, from the 
perspective of optimal aid project size, it is certain that the quality, good or bad, of aid is   24
determined by this average log value. That is to say, countries providing large-scale 
projects tend to be assessed as providing appropriate projects. 
 
Graph 5: Average size weight in IDP versus average log aid activity commitment, 2003 
 
Roodman (2006), Figure 2. 
 
In Graph 5, the average log aid activity value for first-placed Denmark is high, and 
the same value for bottom-placed Japan is low.  Intuitively this differs from our 
recognition. This is because of the recognition that Japan’s aid features many large-scale 
projects in monetary terms, represented primarily by infrastructure projects.  In order 
to ensure consistency with Figure 5, we conduct analysis using 2003 commitment data.   
The actual amount of project aid provided by Denmark and Japan in 2003 
(amountus000 in CRS data) and the natural log conversion are shown as descriptive 
statistics in Table 7.  As you can see from the table, although in terms of actual aid 




Table 7: Project Amounts for Japan and Denmark in 2003   
   N  mean  Sd  Min  max 
Denmark amountus000  365 1,855.74 3,965.17 151.88  49,740.29
 Ln  (amountus000)  365 6.58 1.21 5.02  10.81
Japan amountus000  6,064 2,404.72 58,819.74 0.01  4,087,360.00
 Ln  (amountus000)  6,064 4.14 2.41 -4.61  15.22
Source: DAC, CRS statistics.   
 
Next take a look at project distribution. As can be seen from Graph 6, there are a total 
of 138 small Japanese projects with a value of less than US$30, and the greatest number 
of projects, 609, are concentrated in the bracket between US$20,090 and US$33,120. 
On the other hand, the highest frequency of Denmark is 74 in the bracket between 
US$403,000 and US$665,000. It shows that the highest frequency of Japan is lower 
than that of Denmark.   
 









































































  Source: DAC, CRS statistics 
                                                  
9  However, in the CRS statistics, as the amount of aid is shown in US$1,000 units, if this were 
converted into US$1 units, the average natural log values would be 11.65 for Japan and 13.48 for 
Denmark, thus reducing the gap between the two.     26
 
What are these less-than-US$30 aid projects being implemented by Japan? Appendix 
Table 1 shows a list of projects with a value of less than US$30. The donor agency in all 
cases is Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the category of aid is ODA 
grant. The numerical codes under “purpose” are CRS purpose codes. This list reveals 
the very interesting fact that Japan has implemented broad spectrum of projects with 
such small amounts of money.   
Next let us examine the content of projects that have a value between US$20,090 and 
US$33,120, the bracket with the highest frequency of projects. These are projects that in 
Japanese yen have values of between 2 million and just under 4 million yen. The 
top-ranked purposes have been compiled in Table 8. The code that appears most 
frequently is 15140, or Aid for Government Administration. There are also many 
projects for the purposes of Policy and Administration Management and also Training 
that appear. These seem to be mainly training projects targeting bureaucrats in 
developing countries, etc. The number of projects displayed in the table is 207, 
accounting for more than one-third of the 609 projects in this bracket.   
Denmark has the most aid projects in the bracket between US$403,000 and 
US$665,000, or between 40 million and 70 million Japanese yen. What kinds of 
projects are being implemented in this bracket? In the same way as for Japan above, a 
table 9 has been prepared incorporating the top-ranked purposes of projects. The total 
number of projects is only 77 to begin with, of which the highest frequency, 9 projects, 
are for the purpose of assistance for human rights. In addition, it shows that many 
projects are related to human rights or health and medical, including social/welfare 
service and sexually transmitted disease (STD) control. Our conjecture that such types   27
of projects do not appear as large sum of money turns out to be wrong.   
 
Table 8: Breakdown of Japan’s Projects by Purpose between US$20,090 and US$33,120 
Purpose Purpose  Name  Total  (JICA) (MOFA)  (MISC.)  (PC)  (PRF) 
15140 GOVERNMENT  ADMINISTRATION      25 10 0 10  0  5
99810  SECTORS NOT SPECIFIED          25 3 14 6  1  1
33110 
TRADE POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT   
23 6 0 16 0 1
16010  SOCIAL/WELFARE  SERVICES    20 13 4 1  0  2
11110 
EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT  
19 5 2 6 4 2
24010 
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT  
17 9 0 7 0 1
12181  MEDICAL  EDUCATION/TRAINING     16 0 6 10  0  0
12220  BASIC  HEALTH  CARE     16 9 4 0  0  3
32110  INDUSTRIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MGMT    16 4 0 8  0  4
11130  TEACHER  TRAINING     15 0 2 0  13  0
41010 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND 
ADMIN. MGMT   
15 13 0 2 0 0
Source: CRS. 
 
Table 9: Breakdown of Denmark’s Projects by Top-ranked Purpose between 
US$403,000 and US$665,000 
Purpose Purpose  Name  Total 
15162 HUMAN  RIGHTS    9
32130 SME  DEVELOPMENT    7
15140 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION     
5
16010  SOCIAL/WELFARE  SERVICES    5
13040 
STD CONTROL INCLUDING 
HIV/AIDS  
4
99810  SECTORS NOT SPECIFIED    4
Source: DAC、CRS. 
Note: SME：Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. 
STD: Sexually Transmitted Diseases.   28
 
In fact, using the average log converted value for project size, the value for Japan 
started falling below that of Denmark in 2003, and in 2002 it can be seen that Japan had 
a larger average value than Denmark (Table 10). The reason behind this seems to be due 
to the fact that from 2003 onwards the number of small-size projects with a value of less 
than US$30 suddenly increases, for whatever reason. In 2002, the lowest project size for 
Japanese aid projects was US$2,470.   
 
Table 10: Project Amounts for Japan and Denmark in 2002 
   Variable  N mean  Sd  Min  max 
Denmark amountus000  380 2,293.87 8,302.08 101.47  120,492.60
 Ln  (amountus000)  380 6.54 1.26 4.62  11.70
Japan amountus000  524 12,775.16 37,135.02 11.80  402,705.50
   Ln  (amountus000)  524 7.62 1.93 2.47  12.91
Source: DAC, CRS.   
 
What can be inferred from the above is the fact that in Japan aid projects are 
registered with the DAC on a per capita training basis, whereas in Denmark the larger 
training framework is registered with the DAC. Given the differences among countries 
concerning the reporting methods for projects in CRS data, there is, at the current point 
in time, mere comparison the average aid project scale among countries is immature. In 
this sense, fragmentation is not evident by project itself rather by the reporting the 
projects. It is necessary for donor countries to make the method in which they register 
aid projects with the DAC consistent.   
 
5.  Conclusion  
That the IDP, which to date has merely assessed assistance by developed countries   29
to developing countries in terms of financial amounts, has attempted to consider aid 
quality and incorporate this in assessment by introducing two concepts of selectivity 
and project proliferation has made a significant contribution to improving aid 
assessment.  
However, as we have argued in this paper, the inclusion of the concept of 
“governance” as one of the indices for selectivity and the use of the KK index as that 
index are points around which there is still room for further discussion. In addition, size 
weights have been introduced as an index to adjust project proliferation, but given the 
fact that a) aid projects are hypothesized under this index to have a lognormal 
distribution (though they generally do not), and b) that the reporting methods for CRS 
data that are used in calculating the index differ from country to country, it can be seen 
that the index, as it presently stands, is incomplete in terms of its validity.   
When it is considered that selectivity and size weight have had a significant 
impact on the compilation of the IDP, it can be seen that there is a necessity to improve 
the IDP in the future.   
As an alternative proposal, perhaps it would be advisable to consider an 
assessment method that would link beneficiary country needs with the type of aid. For 
example, with regard to countries with a high degree of poverty, donor countries that 
provide efficient aid focused on the poverty-stricken sector would receive a high 
assessment. Already, “direct assistance to poor people” and “good governance” markers 
exist within CRS data. In actual fact, in the calculation of selectivity, an 
across-the-board discount rate of 50% has already been set for countries with poor 
governance with regard to aid that is marked under “good governance.” (Refer to p.9 of 
this paper.) There is no option not to use these sorts of markers. However, it also goes   30
without saying that there is a necessity among donor countries to ensure that marker 
registration for the CRS is conducted in a consistent manner.   
With regard to project proliferation, the IDP establishes a unique benchmark as 
optimal project size and discounts projects that diverge from that benchmark, which in 
itself is not appropriate or optimal. It has always been the case that in developing 
countries there have been a variety of assistance needs, including education and 
infrastructure, and the optimal project size for such needs will naturally differ. 
Accordingly, is it not therefore the case that aid required by developing countries 
includes projects of varying sizes and is close to a lognormal distribution? In that sense, 
it can be thought to be a problem when the distribution starts to move away from one 
that is lognormal. It is thus thought appropriate to elicit a method whereby donor 
countries that are diverging from a lognormal distribution—in other words, donor 
countries that are providing many small-scale projects—could be penalized in some 
way.  
   31
Appendix Table 1: List of Japanese Aid Projects Less than US$30 (2003) 
Agency Trans.  No. Recipient Name  Purpose Purpose Name 
Amount 
( US$ 000) 
JICA  030406T  HUNGARY        32110 INDUSTRIAL  POLICY  &  ADMIN.  MGMT         0.01
JICA  033085T  COOK  ISLANDS   11330 VOCATIONAL  TRAINING                      0.02
JICA  032091T  BRAZIL          14010 WATER  RESOURCES  POLICY/ADMIN.  MGMT    0.02
JICA  033836T  THAILAND       14040 RIVER  DEVELOPMENT                        0.02
JICA  030240T  MALTA          14050 WASTE  MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL             0.02
JICA  030513T  LATVIA          14050 WASTE  MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL             0.02
JICA  030759T  CAPE  VERDE     15110
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
P O L I C Y / P L A N N I N G                           
0.02
JICA  030908T  MALI            15110
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 




D E M . R E P .        
15110
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
P O L I C Y / P L A N N I N G                           
0.02
JICA  030944T  BENIN           15110
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 




U                
15110
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 




KITTS-NEVIS    
15140 GOVERNMENT  ADMINISTRATION             0.02
JICA  032586T  SURINAME       15140 GOVERNMENT  ADMINISTRATION             0.02
JICA  030538T  ARMENIA        16010 SOCIAL/WELFARE  SERVICES                  0.02
JICA  031917T  PANAMA         16010 SOCIAL/WELFARE  SERVICES                  0.02
JICA  033233T  MALDIVES       16010 SOCIAL/WELFARE  SERVICES                  0.02
JICA 030276T 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC       
16020 EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT.      0.02
JICA  030565T  MOROCCO       16020 EMPLOYMENT  POLICY  AND  ADMIN.  MGMT.    0.02
JICA  032510T  NEPAL           16020 EMPLOYMENT  POLICY  AND  ADMIN.  MGMT.    0.02
JICA 032810T 
PALESTINIAN 
ADMIN. AREAS   
16020 EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT.      0.02
JICA  032850T  SYRIA            16020 EMPLOYMENT  POLICY  AND  ADMIN.  MGMT.    0.02
JICA  033093T  FIJI              16020 EMPLOYMENT  POLICY  AND ADMIN.  MGMT.    0.02
JICA  030751T  CAMEROON      16030
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  032495T  MALDIVES       16030 HOUSING  POLICY  AND  ADMIN.  0.02  32
M A N A G E M E N T                               
JICA  030500T  ROMANIA        21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  030673T  TUNISIA          21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  031063T  RWANDA         21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  031276T  ZAMBIA          21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  031347T  SENEGAL        21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  031636T  NICARAGUA      21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  032224T  IRAN             21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  032690T  CHINA           21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  032799T  JORDAN          21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  030428T  LATVIA          21040 WATER  TRANSPORT                          0.02
JICA  032480T  PERU            21040 WATER  TRANSPORT                          0.02
JICA  031960T  COLOMBIA       21050 AIR  TRANSPORT                              0.02
JICA  033264T  PAKISTAN        21050 AIR  TRANSPORT                              0.02
JICA  030463T  ALBANIA         23010
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 




AFRICAN REP.     
24010
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  034289T  FIJI              24010
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  034314T  NIUE             24010
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  030754T  CAMEROON      31120 AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT              0.02
JICA  030802T  GABON          31120 AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT              0.02
JICA 030841T 
EQUATORIAL 
G U I N E A          
31120 AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT              0.02
JICA  031773T  ST.  LUCIA        31120 AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT              0.02  33
JICA 030368T 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC       
31130 AGRICULTURAL  LAND  RESOURCES            0.02
JICA  030588T  TUNISIA          31130 AGRICULTURAL  LAND  RESOURCES            0.02
JICA  030792T  ETHIOPIA        31130 AGRICULTURAL  LAND  RESOURCES            0.02
JICA  031337T  RWANDA         31130 AGRICULTURAL  LAND  RESOURCES            0.02
JICA  031672T  CUBA            31130 AGRICULTURAL  LAND  RESOURCES            0.02
JICA  032484T  PERU            31130 AGRICULTURAL  LAND  RESOURCES            0.02
JICA  033068T  VIET  NAM        31130 AGRICULTURAL  LAND  RESOURCES            0.02
JICA  033670T  LAOS            31150 AGRICULTURAL  INPUTS                      0.02
JICA 030371T 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC       
31220 FORESTRY  DEVELOPMENT                    0.02
JICA  030556T  ALGERIA         31220 FORESTRY  DEVELOPMENT                    0.02
JICA  030755T  CAMEROON      31220 FORESTRY  DEVELOPMENT                    0.02
JICA  031388T  BARBADOS       31320 FISHERY  DEVELOPMENT                      0.02
JICA  031591T  BELIZE           31320 FISHERY  DEVELOPMENT                      0.02
JICA 031766T 
ST. 
KITTS-NEVIS    
31320 FISHERY  DEVELOPMENT                      0.02
JICA  031987T  GUYANA         31320 FISHERY  DEVELOPMENT                      0.02
JICA  032031T  GRENADA        31320 FISHERY  DEVELOPMENT                      0.02
JICA  032589T  SURINAME       31320 FISHERY  DEVELOPMENT                      0.02
JICA 033193T 
SOLOMON 
I S L A N D S         
31320 FISHERY  DEVELOPMENT                      0.02
JICA  031795T  ARGENTINA      31391 FISHERY  SERVICES                           0.02
JICA  031353T  SENEGAL        32110 INDUSTRIAL  POLICY  &  ADMIN.  MGMT         0.02
JICA  032490T  INDIA            32110 INDUSTRIAL  POLICY  &  ADMIN.  MGMT         0.02
JICA  032118T  PERU            32161 AGRO-INDUSTRIES                           0.02
JICA  032361T  MYANMAR       32161 AGRO-INDUSTRIES                           0.02
JICA  030989T  GHANA          32169 BASIC  METAL  INDUSTRIES                    0.02
JICA  033598T  CAMBODIA       32220 MINERAL PROSPECTION AND EXPLORATION    0.02
JICA  031869T  JAMAICA         33210
TOURISM POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  033114T  NAURU          33210
TOURISM POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  033128T  NIUE             33210
TOURISM POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  033210T  TUVALU         33210 TOURISM  POLICY  AND  ADMIN.  0.02  34
M A N A G E M E N T                               
JICA  034303T  KIRIBATI         33210
TOURISM POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  034387T  TONGA           33210
TOURISM POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.02
JICA  030318T  MALTA          41010
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M G M T                                       
0.02
JICA  030437T  UKRAINE         41010
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M G M T                                       
0.02
JICA  031741T  HAITI            41010
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. 




REPUBLIC       
43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.02
JICA  030485T  HUNGARY        43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.02
JICA  030798T  ETHIOPIA        43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.02
JICA  031258T  UGANDA         43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.02
JICA  031334T  ZIMBABWE       43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.02
JICA  031777T  ST.  LUCIA        43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.02
JICA  032790T  IRAN             43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.02
JICA  033018T  SRI  LANKA       43082 RESEARCH/SCIENTIFIC  INSTITUTIONS         0.02
JICA 033169T 
PAPUA NEW 
G U I N E A          
11230 BASIC LIFE SKILLS FOR YOUTH  &  ADULTS     0.03
JICA  030407T  POLAND         11330 VOCATIONAL  TRAINING                      0.03
JICA  031202T  NAMIBIA         11330 VOCATIONAL  TRAINING                      0.03
JICA  032265T  LEBANON        11330 VOCATIONAL  TRAINING                      0.03




I A   U N S P .         
12220 BASIC  HEALTH  CARE                         0.03
JICA  030243T  TURKEY         14010 WATER  RESOURCES  POLICY/ADMIN.  MGMT    0.03
JICA  031028T  NIGER           14010 WATER  RESOURCES  POLICY/ADMIN.  MGMT    0.03
JICA 032280T  SAUDI  ARABIA    14010 WATER  RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT      0.03
JICA  031187T  MAURITIUS      14020 WATER  SUPPLY  &  SANIT.  – LARGE  SYST.       0.03
JICA 030359T 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC       
14050 WASTE  MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL             0.03
JICA  030374T  SLOVAK  14050 WASTE  MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL             0.03  35
REPUBLIC       
JICA  030891T  MALAWI         14050 WASTE  MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL             0.03
JICA  031006T  COTE  D'IVOIRE   14050 WASTE  MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL             0.03
JICA  032686T  CHINA           14050 WASTE  MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL             0.03
JICA  031370T  DJIBOUTI         15110
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
P O L I C Y / P L A N N I N G                           
0.03
JICA  032454T  PARAGUAY      16020 EMPLOYMENT  POLICY  AND  ADMIN.  MGMT.    0.03
JICA  031359T  ERITREA         16061 CULTURE  AND  RECREATION                  0.03
JICA  031051T  ZIMBABWE       21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.03
JICA  033019T  SRI  LANKA       21010
TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.03
JICA  031879T  MEXICO          21020 ROAD  TRANSPORT                           0.03
JICA  032135T  URUGUAY        21040 WATER  TRANSPORT                          0.03
JICA 032814T 
PALESTINIAN 
ADMIN. AREAS   
21040 WATER  TRANSPORT                          0.03
JICA  033201T  TONGA           22020 TELECOMMUNICATIONS                      0.03
JICA  030570T  MOROCCO       22030 RADIO/TELEVISION/PRINT  MEDIA             0.03
JICA  030954T  ETHIOPIA        22030 RADIO/TELEVISION/PRINT  MEDIA             0.03
JICA 030366T 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC       
23010
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.03
JICA  031467T  GUATEMALA     23010
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.03
JICA  032419T  COLOMBIA       23010
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.03
JICA  030490T  POLAND         24010
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.03
JICA  030542T  ARMENIA        25010
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & 
I N S T I T U T I O N S                                
0.03
JICA  032210T  TAJIKISTAN      25010
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & 
I N S T I T U T I O N S                                
0.03
JICA  033203T  TONGA           25010
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & 
I N S T I T U T I O N S                                
0.03
JICA  030527T  UKRAINE         31120 AGRICULTURAL  DEVELOPMENT              0.03
JICA  031350T  SENEGAL        31130 AGRICULTURAL  LAND  RESOURCES            0.03
JICA  030883T  MADAGASCAR   31150 AGRICULTURAL  INPUTS                      0.03  36
JICA 030275T 
FYROM-MACE
DONIA          
31163 LIVESTOCK                                  0.03
JICA  031012T  COTE  D'IVOIRE   31182 AGRICULTURAL  RESEARCH                   0.03
JICA 033292T  BANGLADESH      31182 AGRICULTURAL  RESEARCH                   0.03
JICA  032893T  MONGOLIA       31220 FORESTRY  DEVELOPMENT                    0.03
JICA 033183T 
PAPUA NEW 
G U I N E A          
31220 FORESTRY  DEVELOPMENT                    0.03
JICA  033826T  PHILIPPINES      31391 FISHERY  SERVICES                           0.03
JICA  031967T  COLOMBIA       32164 CHEMICALS                                  0.03
JICA  032230T  IRAN             32164 CHEMICALS                                  0.03
JICA  031014T  MAURITIUS      33210
TOURISM POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.03
JICA  031644T  NICARAGUA      33210
TOURISM POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M A N A G E M E N T                               
0.03
JICA  031850T  HONDURAS      41010
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. 
M G M T                                       
0.03
JICA  030797T  ETHIOPIA        43030 URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT    0.03
JICA  032289T  SAUDI ARABIA    43030 URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT    0.03
JICA  030926T  CAMEROON      43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.03
JICA  032124T  PERU            43040 RURAL  DEVELOPMENT                       0.03
Source: DAC, CRS   37
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